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A seven-year-old girl lies in a hospital bed, surrounded by intimidating
machines, receiving her twice-weekly dialysis treatment.' Diagnosed with
hemolytic-uremic syndrome and malignant hypertension, she has already
had both of her kidneys removed.2 Her name is Kathleen Hart, and without
a kidney transplant from her twin sister, she will likely die
Since the first kidney transplant involving a living human donor
occurred in 1954,4 noncadaveric organ donations have been an important
source of life-saving organs for patients in desperate need, leading to over
40,000 transplants.' A major impediment to such transplants, however, is
the lack of available organs from both living and deceased donors.
6 Further
1. "Dialysis is an artificial means of removing the waste products and extra fluid from the
blood when the kidneys are unable to do so on their own.... For young and otherwise healthy
people, transplantation is usually preferred over dialysis because it affords a better quality of life."
DAVID E. LARSON, MAYO CLINIC FAMILY HEALTH BOOK 856 (2d ed. 1996).
2. JOSEPH C. SEGEN, CURRENT MED TALK 372 (1995) (defining hemolytic-uremic syndrome
as a " clinical complex often accompanied by a prodrome of bloody diarrhea, most commonly
occurring in the summer").
3. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
4. John P. Merrill et al., Successftd Homotransplantation of the Human Kidney Between
Identical Twins, 160 JAMA 277 (1956).
5. From 1988 to 2000, 42,920 of the 233,918 reported organ transplants in the United States
involved organs from living donors. United Network for Organ Sharing, Transplants, at
http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/critdatatransplants-ustx.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
6. Jennifer Rutherford-McClure, Comment & Note, To Donate or Not To Donate Your
Organs: Texas Can Decide for You When You Cannot Decide for Yourself, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 241, 243 (2000) ("On average, three thousand people will die each year while waiting for an
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complicating the matter is the fact that not all organs are compatible with
each potential recipient; there is a serious risk that a recipient's body will
reject a transplanted organ.' In addition, because people's organs grow as
they get older, a donor must be close to the recipient in age, or at least
stature, for the transplanted organ to "fit" properly.' For these reasons,
members of a patient's immediate family, especially siblings, are among the
best potential organ donors.9 The ideal donor would, of course, be an
identical twin.'"
Neither children," nor adults suffering from severe mental
impairment, 2 are permitted to make decisions regarding medical treatment
organ transplant. Currently, there are over fifty-eight thousand people waiting for transplants, but
in 1997, only fifty-five hundred organs were donated." (emphasis added)).
7. Mark F. Anderson, Encouraging Bone Marrow Transplants from Unrelated Donors: Some
Proposed Solutions to a Pressing Social Problem, 54 U. PIr. L. REV. 477, 482 (1993) ("A major
risk in any organ transplant is that the immune system of the organ recipient will identify the
transplanted tissue as a foreign invader and attempt to destroy it. This phenomenon is commonly
called 'rejection.' Rejection can be reduced or even eliminated by requiring a very close match
between the donor's tissue type and the recipient's."); see also MASS. GEN. HOSP. ORGAN
TRANSPLANT TEAM & HF. PIZER, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 18 (1991) [hereinafter ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS] ("When transplanted organs are rejected, it is because the recipient's immune
system recognizes that the surface antigens on the replacement organ do not match his or her own
surface antigens.").
8. ROBERT FINN, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 52-53 (2000). Finn explains:
[One of the] factors that govern[s] whether a particular donor organ may be suitable for
a particular recipient... [is] its size in comparison to the recipient ... . A heart from a
120-pound woman could not maintain the circulation of a 250-pound man. Conversely,
a set of lungs from a large man would not be able to expand properly in the chest of a
small wornn.
Id.
9. R. GRANT STEEN & JOSEPH MIRRO, JR., CHILDHOOD CANCER 158 (2000) (" If the patient
has a sibling who is a perfect match, that sibling would be the best donor.").
10. See MARIE BAKITAS WHEDON, BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 110 (1991) ("A
patient lucky enough to have an identical twin may be a candidate for what is called a syngenic
transplant. In this case, there is complete genetic identity at all histocompatibility loci.").
11. It is not entirely accurate to say that all children are deemed incompetent to make medical
decisions. Many courts have recognized that so-called mature minors have the ight to make such
decisions for themselves. See, e.g., E.G. v. E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (I11. 1989) (holding that
if "the minor is mature enough to appreciate the consequences of her actions, and... the minor is
mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine affords her
the common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment"). The Supreme Court has held
that mature minors have the right to decide for themselves whether to have an abortion. Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (plurality opinion) (holding that states cannot require a minor to
obtain parental consent before obtaining an abortion if "she is mature enough and well enough
informed to make her abortion decision ... independently"). Thus, the term "children" as used in
this Note should be read as encompassing only those minors who are legally unable to tender
consent to medical procedures on their own.
This Note does not purport to limit the rights of mature minors, nor to establish criteria for
distinguishing mature from nonmature minors, accepting instead the already well-established legal
framework for addressing such issues. See generally Wanda K. Mohr & Sheila Suess Kennedy,
The Conundrum of Children in the U.S. Health Care System, in 8 NURSING ETHICS 196 (2001)
(discussing the gradual recognition of the right of mature minors to make health-care decisions for
themselves).
12. It is not the purpose of this Note to propose a framework for determining when an adult's
mental disabilities are sufficiently severe to warrant a finding of legal incompetence. Again, this
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for themselves; both groups generally depend on their legal guardians (most
often, parent-guardians) to tender "proxy consent" for such treatment.
1 3
The term "incompetents" is used throughout this Note to refer to those
who, for reasons of age or mental defect, are legally incapable of tendering
consent.
In recent years, the right of parent-guardians to consent to organ
donation on behalf of their incompetent wards has been severely criticized
by many academics.14 Several commentators, while not arguing for a
prohibition on the practice, nonetheless regard it with great skepticism,"
5 or
fail to reach any definite conclusions. 6 Some articles ignore the
constitutional dimension of the issue and focus instead on potential
legislative responses."
Note accepts the already existing, well-developed standards in this area. See, e.g., Stephen Billick
et al., Competency To Content to Hospitalization in the Medical Patient, 25 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 191 (1997) (discussing determinants of legal competency to consent to medical
procedures); Marya E. Pollack & Stephen B. Billick, Competency To Consent to Treatment, 70
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 303 (1999) (same).
13. See In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 121 (Mass. 1980) ("In the absence of consent or its
equivalent, it has been common practice to seek the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent
patient."); Parents United for Better Schs., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 646 A.2d 689, 691 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1994) ("The principle that parental consent must be secured before medical treatment [is]
provided is time honored .... Generally, it is for the parent in the first instance to decide what is
actually necessary for the protection and preservation of the life of his or her child."); see also
Dan Brock, What Is the Moral Authority of Family Members To Act as Surrogates of incompetent
Patients?, 74 MILBANK Q. 599, 599 (1996) (discussing the philosophical basis for the fight of
families to make important decisions on behalf of incompetent patients).
14. See, e.g., Russell Scott, The Terrible Imbalance: Human Organs and Tissues for
Therapy A Review of Demand and Supply, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 139, 143 (1993)
(questioning the "morality of removing tissues from children or others who lack capacity or
whose consent is not free"); Cara Cheyette, Note, Organ Harvests from the Legally Incompetent:
An Argument Against Compelled Altruism, 41 B.C. L. REV. 465, 477 (2000). See generally Joel
D. Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant Imperative: Protecting Living Donors from the
Pressure To Donate, 20 J. CORP. L. 139 (1995) (discussing the need for additional safeguards for
potential donors when the recipient is a family member).
15. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse To Determine When Parents
Should Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L.
REV. 1, 57 (2000) (arguing that in the context of organ donation by a minor, "assuming a parental
conflict of interest is justified because a parent who is considering the benefits of donation to the
ill child would be unable to consider fairly the risks and benefits to the donor child. Moreover,
donation constitutes an extraordinary medical treatment because it is, by definition, non-
therapeutic" ).
16. See, e.g., Howard S. Schwartz, Bioethical and Legal Considerations in Increasing the
Supply of Transplantable Organs: From UAGA to "Baby Fae, " 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 397, 424-28,
437 (1985) ("There is no 'right' approach because different ethical theories lead to different
results. Some approaches are ethically preferable because they further interests in fairness of
resource allocation and individual autonomy, but are less efficient to administer. Others are less
expensive financially, but contain other societal costs." ).
17. See, e.g., Bryan Shartle, Comment, Proposed Legislation for Safely Regulating the
Increasing Number of Living Organ and Tissue Donations by Minors, 61 LA. L. REV. 433, 438-44
(2001) (discussing the statutory fight of minors under Louisiana law to consent to treatment for
diseases and the general right of parents to overrule a minor's decision against treatment).
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Moreover, proxy consent has been found invalid by many courts.s
Those cases in which courts have found that parent-guardians do have the
right to tender proxy consent are surprisingly terse and relatively cursory in
their analyses. 9
In this Note, I argue that the constitutional rights of children and
mentally impaired persons (collectively, incompetents) are violated when
the law fails to provide a mechanism through which proxy consent" may be
tendered for donation of a nonvital organ2 to an immediate family member.
I further demonstrate that, in general, the Constitution accords parent-
guardians,22 and not judges, ultimate authority for determining whether
such organ donation is appropriate.23
18. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding, with regard to a
seventeen-year-old retarded adolescent with the mental capacity of a three- or four-year-old, that
"neither his parents nor the courts can authorize surgical intrusion on Roy for the purpose of
donating one of his kidneys to his sister, Beverly"); In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d
180, 182 (Wis. 1975) ("In the absence of real consent on his part, and in a situation where no
benefit to him has been established, we fail to find any authority for the county court, or this court,
to approve this operation."); see Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (111. 1990) (declining to allow
a bone marrow transplant where one parent consents, one parent objects, and the potential
recipient is a half-brother to whom the potential donor has no significant relationship); see also
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Ky. 1969) (Steinfeld, J., dissenting) (declaring that he
was "unwilling to hold that the gates should be open to permit the removal of an organ from an
incompetent for transplant, at least until such time as it is conclusively demonstrated that it will be
of significant benefit to the incompetent").
19. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (noting in passing, without
reasoning or analysis, that parents have the right to consent on behalf of their children to
operations intended to benefit other family members); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 388 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1972) ("The court [in Strunk) held that a court of equity does have such power [to
authorize transplants], applying also the 'doctrine of substituted judgment.' Therefore, this court is
of the opinion that it has the power to act in this matter."); Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 148-49 (stating
without elaboration that "substantial evidence" indicates that the transplant would be in the "best
interest" of the incompetent donor while incongruously claiming to apply the doctrine of
"substituted judgment").
20. 1 use the term "proxy consent" throughout this Note to refer to consent tendered by some
third party on behalf of an individual legally incapable of offering or refusing such consent on his
own behalf.
21. The phrase " nonvital organs" refers to kidneys, portions of the liver, and bone marrow.
Although liver and bone marrow regenerate after donation while a kidney does not, the risks
associated with donation of any of these organs are small. See infra Part I.
22. The term "parent-guardian" should be read as encompassing grandparent-guardians as
well. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977) ("Decisions concerning child
rearing,... [which are] entitled to constitutional protection, long have been shared with
grandparents or other relatives who occupy the same household-indeed who may take on major
responsibility for the rearing of the children.").
23. I add the qualifier "in general" because, as discussed later in this Note, see infra notes
107, 110-111 and accompanying text, this second thesis does not extend to the rare case where the
potential donor was a once-competent mature minor or adult who has since lapsed into legal
incompetency.
Moreover, the topic of this Note should not be confused with the debate over whether
parents of anencephalic infants should be able to consent to the donation of their children's
organs. Because parental consent to organ donation on behalf of anencephalic infants raises moral
issues above and beyond those arising from the matters at issue in this Note, that practice is not
considered here. See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992) (holding that parents may not
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Part I of this Note examines the available statistics regarding organ
donation and explores the safety of such procedures. In particular, it
demonstrates that organ donation poses only small risks to a donor's
physical and psychological well-being. Part ii studies proxy consent from
the perspective of children and mentally impaired individuals, arguing that
an absolute prohibition on proxy consent for organ donation-whether
legislatively or judicially imposed-would violate their right to bodily
integrity and run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.
With the principle established that some mechanism for proxy consent
must exist, Part III studies the matter from the perspective of parent-
guardians. My ultimate conclusion is that the decision of parent-guardians
to tender or withhold proxy consent may not constitutionally be second-
guessed by judges. This conclusion can be reached either through a
conservative approach or through a more radical departure from common
assumptions in this area.
First, I examine the rights of parent-guardians, accepting arguendo the
traditional assumption that they are bound to act in the best interests of their
wards. Because the decision as to whether organ donation is in the best
interests of an incompetent is based primarily on value judgments and
subjective, nonquantifiable factors, I assert that it falls squarely within the
constitutionally protected range of discretion of parent-guardians, and may
not be reviewed by courts.
Ultimately, however, I reject the traditional assumption, arguing instead
that parents need not make this decision based solely on the prospective
donor's best interests. Parent-guardians have the right to take into account
other factors, such as the demands of morality and the best interests of the
family as a whole. As a practical matter, it is irrelevant which of these
arguments one accepts, because the family's decision in either case is
unreviewable. Nonetheless, I argue that this latter framework is more
consistent with recognizing the dignity and humanity of both children and
the mentally impaired.
Part IV addresses a potential ethical dilemma arising from the right of
parent-guardians to tender proxy consent for organ donation-the
phenomenon of parents conceiving children specifically to be organ donors.
This Part examines how the frequency and success rate of such endeavors
are greatly enhanced by emerging reproductive and genetic technologies. It
concludes, however, that these consequences are not legitimate grounds for
opposing this Note's theses regarding proxy consent. Part V concludes.
This Note does not pretend to offer a complete solution to this nation's
chronic organ shortage. Instead, this Note attempts to mitigate, however
have an anencephalic infant declared brain-dead, absent cessation of circulatory and respiratory
functions, for the purpose of having her organs harvested).
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slightly, the harsh effects of this shortage by arguing for recognition of the
right of children and mentally impaired individuals to donate their organs to
immediate family members, and the right of parent-guardians to consent to
such donation. Awareness of such rights will help ensure that human life is
not unnecessarily extinguished by ill-informed legislative policies or
judicial determinations, and that the dignity of those unable to act on their
own behalf is respected.'
I. ORGAN DONATION: STATISTICS AND RISKS
Every year, the number of organ transplants from living donors
continues to increase.25 Between 1988 and 2000, close to 140,000 kidney
transplants were conducted; over 41,000 of these procedures involved
kidneys from living donors.26 During the same period, over 46,000 liver
transplants occurred, with over 1000 involving donations from live
donors." Since 1987, between 60,000 and 70,000 bone marrow transplants
were made possible by living donation.
Siblings, including minor siblings, constitute a sizable pool of living
organ donors. Since 1996, 109 children have received kidney transplants,
and four children have received liver transplants, from either a full or half-
sibling.29
The supply of organs available for transplantation is still dwarfed by
demand, however. As of January 15, 2002, there were 50,803 patients
waiting to receive kidneys and 18,744 in need of livers; 1849 of these
patients were under the age of eighteen." Nearly half of the people on the
waiting list were of ethnicities other than Caucasian." At any given time,
24. In McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (C.P. 1978), the court affirmed:
For our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat
the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would know no limits,
and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.
Id. at 91. This Note addresses situations where the potential donor-due to age or mental
infirmity-is unable to make a determination on her own as to whether to donate.
25. See United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Nat'l Marrow Donor Program, Marrow Donation, at http://www.marrow.orglFAQS/
marrowfaqs.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
29. United Network for Organ Sharing, Transplants, at http://www.unos.org/Newsroon
critdatatransplants-relation.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
30. United Network for Organ Sharing, Waiting List, at http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/
critdatawait.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
31. Of the nearly 85,000 people waiting for an organ transplant, over 21,000 were black, over
11,000 were Hispanic, and close to 4700 were of other ethnicities. Id. Removing barriers to
donation by family members is particular important to minorities because it is more difficult to
find compatible organs from unrelated donors. See Ian Ayres et al., Unequal Racial Access to
Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 805, 808-09 (1993) (discussing how it is difficult for
African Americans to be matched with compatible unrelated donors because "antigens are
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1220 [Vol.1I11: 1215
Organ Donation by Incompetents
over 3000 patients are looking for a compatible bone marrow donor in the
National Bone Marrow Program Registry.32
As the above statistics indicate, transplant procedures have become
fairly commonplace and pose little risk to donors. Kidney donation, for
example, is for the most part safe and painless.33 "Under local anesthesia a
long thin tube, called a catheter, is introduced into the artery in the groin,
and a special dye is injected that permits the radiologist to examine the
kidney[s'] circulation."' The physician then X-rays both kidneys; the dye
allows her to determine which has fewer blood vessels attached to it.
Finally, while the patient is under general anesthesia,
[a]n incision is made over the tip of the twelfth or last rib, and a
portion of the bone is removed. The donor kidney is carefully
exposed, its blood vessels and ureter are identified, and when all is
ready, it is separated from the blood supply and removed from the
body .... [T]he donor's wound will be sewn together and he or she
will be allowed to wake up.35
Liver transplants are similarly safe because only a portion of the
donor's liver is removed.36 Due to the liver's regenerative capacity, both the
transplanted portion as well as the donor's own liver are able to grow into
whole, fully functioning organs.37 "More than 100 -living related liver
distributed differently among racial groups" and "[w]hites donate almost ninety percent of
kidneys in the United States," meaning "white patients are more likely to have antigens that
match those on donated kidneys").
32. Nat'l Marrow Donor Program, About the National Marrow Donor Program, at
http://www.marrow.org/NMDP/about-nmdp-idx.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2002).
33. ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 7, at 151 ("Serious complications are extremely
rare.... The most common problem, which is relatively minor, is difficulty in passing urine
immediately after surgery."). One study reveals that out of 40,000 transplant procedures, roughly
twenty donors died (0.05%). T.E. Starzl, Living Donors, 19 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 174, 174
(1987). In the words of one court:
The short-range risk to a donor is negligible .... [T]he surgical risk is no more than the
risk of the anesthesia. The operative procedure would last about two and one-half
hours. There would be some minor postoperative pain but no more than in any other
surgical procedure. The donor would be hospitalized for about eight days and would be
able to resume normal activities in thirty days. Assuming an uneventful recovery, the
donor would thereafter be restricted only from violent contact sports. She would be able
to engage in all of the normal life activities of an active young girl.
Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
34. ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 7, at 150.
35. Id. at 151.
36. FINN, supra note 8, at 226 (" [Tlhe liver is a very large organ with several segments.
Surgeons have discovered ways to remove only a single segment.... [T]he small portion of the
liver transplanted into a child, for example, will grow with the child, and will remain completely
functional and normal in size.").
37. Id. ("[L]iver tissue regenerates. That means that the remaining portion of the donor's
liver will-within just a few months-expand to make up the portion that's missing.").
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transplantations have been performed world wide, and donor mortality or
major morbidity has not been reported." 38
Bone-marrow transplants are the most effective form of treatment for
leukemia and over thirty other types of blood diseases.3 9 They, too, are
relatively uncomplicated.
Donating bone marrow involves little risk and only a small amount
of discomfort. The harvesting of bone marrow generally takes
place... with the donor under general anesthesia. A long needle is
inserted into the hip bone, which has a large supply of bone
marrow. Several bone punctures on each hip will be required to
remove the necessary amount of marrow."g
This procedure poses no serious health risks, even for child donors.
According to one study based on twenty years of data involving bone
marrow donations by children less than four years old, such "surgery can
be safely performed with minimal risk[;] ... neither age nor size should be
a contraindication to the donation of bone marrow."4
Organ donation is also virtually free of adverse long-term consequences
for donors. Kidney donors do not have a heightened risk for renal failure
later in life.42 Because donated liver and bone marrow naturally regenerate,
their donation entails essentially no long-term ramifications."3
Notwithstanding the high level of physical safety of donation
procedures, it has been argued that donors often suffer adverse
psychological consequences from their experience. One commentator
summarizes a study on children who donated bone marrow to siblings by
38. Xavier Rogiers & Christoph E. Broelsch, Surgical Aspects, in LIVER TRANSPLANTATION
143, 149 (James Neuberger & Michael R. Lucey eds., 1994); see also FINN, supra note 8, at 228
(" [A]lIthough the donor experiences major surgery, the risks are relatively small, and the recovery
period is usually about the same as for kidney donors.").
39. H. Gilbert Welch & Eric B. Larson, Cost Effectiveness of Bone Marrow Transplantation
in Acute Non-Lymphocytic Leukemia, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 807 (1989).
40. FINN, supra note 8, at 113.
41. Leonard A. Valentino et al., Bone Marrow Donation by Small Children, in BONE
MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 389, 393 (Robert Peter Gale & Richard E. Champlin eds., 1989).
42. THE MULTI-ORGAN DONOR 189 (Robert S.D. Higgins et al. eds., 1997) (" Based on more
than 20 long-term studies of kidney donors, consensus among the transplant community is that
well-selected donors incur no increased risk of ESRD [end stage renal disorder] over the general
population."); see also Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (" [T]he risk to
the donor is such that life insurance actuaries do not rate such individuals higher than those with
two kidneys. The only real risk would be trauma to the one remaining kidney, but testimony
indicated that such trauma is extremely rare in civilian life.").
43. Marrow removed for transplantation "is replaced by the body within 4 to 6 weeks, so
there is no significant adverse risk to the donor. Specifically, there is no increased risk of infection
or susceptibility to infection since the remainder of the marrow is more than adequate to protect
the donor." ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 210 (Barbara A. Helene Williams et al. eds., 1991). In a
study of 3290 bone-marrow transplants, 0.27% involved complications, and none resulted in
deaths or "permanent sequelae." Id. at 211. On the regeneration of liver tissue, see supra notes
36-37.
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claiming that "fully one-third of children whose siblings were bone marrow
recipients suffered from signs of post traumatic stress syndrome." " The
commentator goes on to point out, however, that "[t]his was true for both
siblings who donated and siblings who did not donate." 45 That is, being an
organ donor did not increase the likelihood that a child with a sibling in
need of a transplant would suffer psychological harm. Moreover, while the
commentator claims that the study demonstrates that children who donated
were more "withdrawn, anxious, depressed and had a lower sense of self
esteem," 4 6 the study in fact concluded that "[dionors seem to cope with the
stress by channeling their efforts into their school work: parents and
teachers reported that they were generally more mature and showed more
leadership potential." 
47
It has also been claimed that kidney donors are at risk for psychological
trauma when the transplant is unsuccessful. "[B]ecause the rejection rate
for even closely matched kidneys can run as high as twenty percent, kidney
donors... may feel that they underwent major surgery and gave up a
kidney for nothing."48 The UCLA study cited for this proposition, however,
found that only 10-20% of donors surveyed suffered negative psychological
consequences. Moreover, the study was based on a questionnaire mailed to
a small group of donors.49
More extensive studies have reached the opposite conclusion. For
example, in a study of 451 living kidney donors with a 92% response rate,
"[a]lmost all of them felt that the donation affected their lives in a positive
way .... Of particular interest was that only three (0.8%) of the donors
regretted the donation, two were undecided (0.5%), and thus almost 99%
reported that they did not regret their decision." 5 0
Thus, claims that organ donation is psychologically harmful to donors
are unsupported, and even contradicted, by research results. Moreover,
donor support programs, such as the successful program at the Hospital for
Sick Children in Ontario, Canada, can dramatically reduce even the
potential for undesirable psychological consequences, especially when
geared to pediatric or mentally impaired donors."'
44. Cheyette, supra note 14, at 477.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 478.
47. Philip Cohen, Donors' Dread: Why Do Children Who Help a Sick Sibling End Up
Depressed?, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 23, 1997, at 20.
48. Cheyette, supra note 14, at 479.
49. Deane L. Wolcott et al., Psychological Adjustment of Adult Bone Marrow Transplant
Donors Whose Recipient Survives, 41 TRANSPLANTATION 484, 484 (1986). The reliability of such
psychological self-assessments is unclear.
50. Ingela Fehrman-Ekholm et al., Kidney Donors Don't Regret, 69 TRANSPLANTATION
2067, 2069 (2000).
5 1. The Experience and Preparation of Pediatric Sibling Bone Marrow Donors, 27 SOC.
WORK HEALTH CARE 89, 89 (1998) ("The donors are engaged in age-appropriate medical play
and are encouraged to discuss their feelings and concerns about their role.... Thus far, 97.5%
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Having examined the procedures involved in organ donation, as well as
the small physical and psychological risks donation poses, it is now
appropriate to examine the right of all people, including children and
mentally impaired persons, to donate nonvital organs when necessary to
save the lives of family members.
II. THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND THE MENTALLY IMPAIRED
As noted earlier, several courts have ruled that parent-guardians may
not tender proxy consent for organ donation on behalf of children or
mentally impaired adults. 2 This Part demonstrates that such blanket
restrictions are unconstitutional. It begins by showing that competent adult
patients have the constitutional right to consent on their own behalf to organ
donation. It then argues that it would violate the Equal Protection Clause
for a legislature or court to prohibit proxy consent for organ donation by
incompetents, or to establish standards for permitting proxy consent that in
practice would never result in an actual donation. This Part concludes by
demonstrating how such a blanket prohibition undermines the fundamental
dignity of children and the mentally impaired as human beings.
A. The Right of Competent Adults To Donate Organs to Immediate
Family Members
No case directly supports the existence of a constitutional right to
donate one's organs to immediate family members because no state has
ever tried to outlaw the practice. Although the sale of organs may be, and is,
prohibited consistent with the Constitution,53 it is not clear that a ban on
altruistic gifts would survive constitutional scrutiny. There are three
constitutional bases for the right to donate organs, especially to family
members: (1) the positive right to bodily integrity as embodied in Roe v.
Wade54 and informed consent cases, (2) the more generalized right to
have rated the program very helpful."); see also K.H. Schultz et al., Comparison of Quality of Life
and Family Stress in Families of Children with Living-Related Liver Transplants Versus Families
of Children Who Received a Cadaveric Liver, 33 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1496, 1497 (2001)
(calling for the "provision of both pre- and postoperative psychological support, not only for the
child receiving the transplant, but also for his whole family").
52. See supra note 18.
53 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1994) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce."). No cases exist wherein a defendant
accused of organ trafficking argued that the statute prohibiting the sale of organs was
unconstitutional. The commercial aspect of organ selling removes such behavior from
constitutionally protected zones of privacy.
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut,55 and (3) the protection of
"fundamental" rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as articulated in Palko v. Connecticut.6
Well-established precedent on both the state57 and federal"8 levels
clearly defines the constitutionally protected negative right to bodily
integrity, which prohibits the government from physically intruding into
people's bodies absent a compelling justification. Other cases, however,
recognize a positive right to bodily integrity as well, broad enough to
encompass the right to donate an organ. For instance, the United States
Supreme Court has held, "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person." 59 State supreme courts have
followed suit-" Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body." 6
The rhetoric in modern abortion cases concerning a woman's right to
control her own body is broad enough to support the right to donate organs,
as it encompasses much more than the right to terminate a pregnancy. 6' For
instance, in Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Kugler, a pre-Roe abortion
case, a district court adopted the plaintiffs contention that "the
55. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
57. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Mass.
1977) (recognizing "the right of a patient to preserve his or her right to privacy against unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances").
58. Federal cases discussing the negative right to bodily integrity have largely addressed the
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of searches involving penetrations into the body. In
such cases, the rights to privacy and bodily integrity are weighed against society's interest in
obtaining potentially incriminating evidence. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985)
(" [T]he intrusion on respondent's privacy interests entailed by the operation [to have a potentially
incriminating bullet removed from his body] can only be characterized as severe. On the other
hand, although the bullet may turn out to be useful to the Commonwealth in prosecuting
respondent, the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a compelling need for it."); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (holding that the Constitution restricts "searches
involving intrusions beyond the body's surface. The interests in human dignity and privacy which
the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired
evidence might be obtained"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) ("[T~he
proceedings by which this conviction was obtained ... shock[] the conscience. Illegally breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents ... is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.").
59. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (refusing to compel a personal
injury plaintiff to undergo a pretrial medical examination).
60. Schlocndorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on other
grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957).
61. See, e.g., Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior Coll., 498 F. Supp. 555, 574 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(describing the right to privacy as "encompass[ing] decisions regarding the integrity and
autonomy of one's body"); Fla. Dep't of Health v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv.,
Inc., Nos. 11300-1983, 1D00-2106, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 1217, at *26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb.
9, 2001) ("The individual right at issue here is a woman's right to control her body and her
future.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), People v. Nixon, 201 N.W.2d 635, 640
n.17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) ("There can be no question as to the right of the woman to possess
and control her body as she sees fit.").
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Constitution protects the right of an individual to control the use and
function of his or her body without unreasonable interference from the
state." 62
Indeed, the factors that led the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade63 to
conclude that the right to privacy includes the right to an abortion also exist
with regard to organ donation to immediate family members.'M Just as
"[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the [pregnant] woman
a distressful life and future," ' so too can the sickness or death of an
immediate family member cause a distressful life and future for an eligible
donor. The anguish of a lost child can end a marriage; the loss of a parent
can be emotionally and financially devastating.
66
For both would-be organ donors and pregnant women contemplating
abortion, " [p]sychological harm" may result from a prohibition on their
contemplated acts, and their " [m]ental and physical health may be taxed."67
Finally, for both groups, such prohibitions would cause severe "distress, for
all concerned." 6' For women seeking an abortion, it would stem from "the
unwanted child, and... the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it";69 for
potential organ donors, it would result from the preventable death of a
family member. Organ donation to immediate family members, like
abortion, is one of "a person's most basic decisions about family," and one
of "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, [a choice] central to personal dignity and autonomy." 70
Moving beyond the abortion context, many informed consent cases
speak not only of the right to refuse medical treatment, but of a more
generalized right to control one's body." Indeed, the same considerations
62. 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1066 (D.N.J. 1972), affd, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974).
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. Indeed, it is because these factors apply with particular force when the prospective
recipient is a family member that the theses of this Note are restricted to such cases.
65. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
66. GEORGE M. BURNELL & ADRIENNE L. BURNELL, CLINICAL MANAGEMENT OF
BEREAVEMENT 51, 79 (1989) (discussing the psychological effects of the death of a parent on
children and the death of a child on parents).
67. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 851 (1992).
71. E.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D.R.I. 1988) (recognizing the right of the
individual to "control fundamental medical decisions that affect his or her own body. This right,
whether described as the principle of personal autonomy, the right of self-determination, or the
right of privacy, is properly grounded in the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause"); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984) ("The privacy right encompasses the right to make decisions concerning the integrity of
one's body."); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App. 1995) (concluding that the
state and federal constitutions "protect[] zones of privacy [that] impose restraints on unwarranted
governmental interference in individual autonomy rights, that is, the freedom to determine for
oneself whether to undergo certain experiences or to perform certain acts" ); see also Rogers v.
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that lead courts to place so much emphasis on informed consent also apply
to organ donation:
[Miedical treatment decisions are, to an extraordinary degree,
intrinsically personal. It is the individual making the decision, and
no one else, who lives with the pain and disease.... who must
undergo or forego the treatment.... [and] who, if he or she
survives, must live with the results of that decision. One's health is
a uniquely personal possession. The decision of how to treat that
possession is of a no less personal nature."
The decision to donate an organ raises these concerns because, like a
therapeutic operation, it requires intrusion into the body. Indeed, in many
ways it represents an even more fundamental decision, because the harm
from not donating is visited upon someone else. It may be extremely
difficult for an individual who does not donate to "live with the results of
that decision." 
73
The right to donate organs can also be derived directly from the right to
privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.74 As the Montana Supreme
Court declared, "Griswold and other privacy decisions can be justified only
on the presumption that [certain] decisions... are so intimate and personal
that people must in principle be allowed to make these decisions for
themselves, consulting their own preferences and convictions, rather than
having society impose its collective decision on them."7 Organ donation
seems to fall within the scope of the "decisions concerning one's body"
that are "protected by the federal constitutional right of privacy." 76
Finally, organ donation can be seen as a fundamental right directly
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7  The
Supreme Court has articulated two standards for determining whether a
right is sufficiently "fundamental" to be protected by the Due Process
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1368 (D. Mass. 1979) ("Each of us has a basic right to care for our
bodies subject to reasonable regulations .... ") (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 154, 989 P.2d 364, 378 (quoting Andrews v. Ballard,
498 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1980)).
73. Id.
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. Armstrong, 1999 MT 261, 47, 989 P.2d at 377 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 106
(First Vantage Book 1994) (1993)); see also Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 380 (Cal.
1993) (en banc) (" [O]ver his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." (quoting JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1859))).
76. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) (allowing the nephew-guardian of a
terminally ill patient with severe physical and mental impairments to have her feeding tube
removed).
77. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "[N]or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
Xiv, § 1.
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Clause-it must be either "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 78 or
it must be "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." 79 The right to do whatever one can, without
violating the rights of others, to save the life of a family member, especially
when the required act involves such an intimate, personal gift, seems
sufficiently "fundamental" to warrant heightened constitutional protection.
Perhaps the greatest testimony to this point is the fact that, as noted earlier,
no state has ever taken steps to prohibit the practice.
Whether one wishes to draw analogies to the abortion cases, informed
consent cases, or general privacy cases, or even consider the issue sui
generis, organ donation to family members falls within "the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter." 80 Although no court has yet
faced the need to articulate such a right, it demands constitutional
recognition.
B. Equal Protection
Even if, as argued in the previous Section, competent adults enjoy the
constitutional right to donate organs to family members, this does not
necessarily mean that the right should be extended to children and the
mentally impaired. To understand why even members of these groups
possess such a right, one must begin by looking to case law in an area in
which the rights of the mentally impaired have long been disregarded-
sterilization.
Of all the states in the union, California has historically had one of the
poorest records of respecting the reproductive liberties of those regarded by
the state as "feeble-minded."" 1 By 1927, it had performed more than 5000
involuntary and compulsory sterilizations, which at the time was "four
times as many as ha[d] been performed for eugenic reasons, in government
78. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). Initially, Palko was a benchmark for determining whether
particular guarantees of the Bill of Rights were "incorporated" through the Fourteenth
Amendment as binding on the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968)
(recognizing that "[t]he test for determining whether a right extended by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments ... is also protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment" is the
Palko standard, as cited by subsequent cases). Palko has since been reinterpreted as a general test
for determining whether a substantive right, whether or not mentioned in the Bill of Rights, must
be respected by the states. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[O1nly personal rights
that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in
this [Fourteenth Amendment] guarantee of personal privacy.") (citation omitted).
79. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
80. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
81. Act of May 17, 1917, ch. 489, § I, 1917 Cal. Stat. 571.
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institutions, in all the rest of the world together." 82 Motivated in large part
to break from this history,83 the state legislature in 1979 repealed the last
remaining compulsory sterilization statute 4 and simultaneously amended
section 2356(d) of the state probate code to read, "No ward or conservatee
may be sterilized under the provisions of this division." 5 Under the
resulting legislative scheme, there was no mechanism through which an
individual legally incapable of offering consent could be sterilized.
In Conservatorship of Valerie N., a mother and stepfather sought to
have their mentally impaired twenty-nine-year-old daughter Valerie, a
victim of Down's Syndrome, sterilized on the ground that a "pregnancy
would cause psychiatric harm" to her.86 The probate court had rejected their
petition, relying on section 2356(d) of the California Probate Code, as well
as the repeal of the compulsory sterilization statutes. The state supreme
court agreed that the probate court had correctly interpreted applicable state
law,87 but held section 2356(d) unconstitutional as applied to Valerie and
others similarly situated. s8
The court found that the statute touched upon Valerie's right to privacy,
and invalidated it on both due process and equal protection grounds.89 The
statute violated the Due Process Clause by infringing on a fundamental
freedom without a compelling state interest. As the court noted, "If the
state withholds from her the only safe and reliable method of contraception
suitable to her condition, it necessarily limits her opportunity for
habilitation and thereby her freedom to pursue a fulfilling life." 90 Because
the exercise of her fundamental right to sterilization would be in Valerie's
best interests, the state could not erect a statutory scheme that failed to
provide any opportunity for her to take advantage of it.
More pertinent to this Note, however, is the other basis on which the
statute was invalidated-the Equal Protection Clause. The court ruled that
section 2356(d) prevented Valerie's parents "from making, and Valerie
from obtaining the advantage of, the one choice that may be best for her,
and which is available to all women competent to choose-contraception
82. Comment, Constitutional Law-Sterilization of Defectives, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 73, 74 n.5
(1927) (quoting Paul Popenoe, Eugenic Sterilization in California, 13 J. SOC. HYGIENE 257, 257
(1927)).
83. See Maxon v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (Ct. App. 1982).
84. Act of Sept. 18, 1979, ch. 730, § 156.5, 1979 Cal. Stat. 2540 (repealing former section
7254 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code); Act of Sept. 10, 1979, ch. 552, § 1, 1979
Cal. Stat. 1762 (same).
85. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (West 1991).
86. 707 P.2d 760, 763 (Cal. 1985).
87. Id. at 771.
88. Id. at 771-72.
89. Id. at 773 (" [W]hether analyzed under due process or equal protection principles, the
issue is whether withholding the option of sterilization as a method of contraception to this class
of women is constitutionally permissible.").
90. Id.
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through sterilization." 91 The court went on to note that section 2356(d)
"denied incompetent women the procreative choice that is recognized as a
fundamental, constitutionally protected right of all other adult women."92 It
acknowledged:
[E]iection of the method of contraception to be utilized, or indeed
whether to choose contraception at all, cannot realistically be
deemed a "choice" available to an incompetent since any election
must of necessity be made on behalf of the incompetent by others.
The interests of the incompetent which mandate recognition of
procreative choice as an aspect of the fundamental right to privacy
and liberty do not differ from the interests of women able to give
voluntary consent to this procedure, however.93
Put another way, the right to choose sterilization is a component of a
woman's reproductive liberty. A woman does not lose the right to be
sterilized simply because she is incompetent; although her condition
prevents her from exercising this right herself, the Constitution requires that
someone be able to do so for her. If no such proxy consent mechanism
exists, she is deprived of the benefits of the exercise of this constitutional
right. Prohibiting the guardians of an incompetent from consenting to
sterilization on her behalf, while permitting a competent woman to consent
to sterilization, violates the Equal Protection Clause, because "[a]n
incompetent developmentally disabled woman has no less interest in a
satisfying or fulfilling life free from the burdens of an unwanted pregnancy
than does her competent sister." 94 Other courts have since come to the same
conclusion on similar grounds.95
This doctrine has also been applied in cases where courts have found
that parent-guardians may decline lifesaving treatment on behalf of
permanently vegetative patients. Again, such proxy consent is the only way
for comatose patients to exercise the right to decline treatment recognized
in the case of competent patients:96
91. Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 772.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 773.
95. In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 369 (Colo. 1981) ("The procreative alternatives available to
competent adults must also extend where possible to individuals who are not mentally competent
to make the choice for themselves."); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981) ("The right to
choose among procreation, sterilization and other methods of contraception is an important
privacy right of all individuals. Our courts must preserve that right. Where an incompetent person
lacks the mental capacity to make that choice, a court should ensure the exercise of that right on
behalf of the incompetent in a manner that reflects his or her best interests.").
96. On the right of competent patients to refuse treatment, see In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
(N.J. 1976). Regarding lifesaving medical treatment, Quinlan held:
[T]he individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and
the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights
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If a putative decision by Karen [a woman in a permanently
vegetative state] to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence
to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of
her right of privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be
discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her
conscious exercise of the choice. The only practical way to prevent
destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family of
Karen to render their best judgment, subject to the qualifications
hereinafter stated, as to whether she would exercise it in these
circumstances .... It is for this reason that we determine that
Karen's right of privacy may be asserted in her behalf, in this
respect, by her guardian and family under the particular
circumstances presented by this record.9"
Thus, although a mentally impaired adult cannot choose on her own behalf
to donate organs, she nonetheless has a constitutionally protected right,
under certain circumstances, to have that choice made for her.
98
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in In re Guardianship of Eberhardy,
rejected such reasoning, holding that the parent-guardians of a severely
retarded girl could not petition the court to have her sterilized.
99 It held that
only the legislature could authorize the use of proxy consent for
sterilization because "a court is not an appropriate forum for making policy
in such a sensitive area." "0 In so ruling, the court disregarded the fact that
it was dealing with a fundamental right; whether or not to allow citizens,
including legally incompetent citizens, to exercise such rights should not be
a matter of legislative policy. As the Supreme Court has explained:
overcome the State interest. It is for that reason that we believe Karen's choice [to
decline feeding tubes], if she were competent to make it, would be vindicated by the
law.
Id. at 664.
97. Id. (holding that the parent-guardian of a patient in a permanently vegetative state may
exercise that patient's right to decline medical treatment, even where such treatment is necessary
to preserve her life); see also Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 423 (Mass. 1977) ("We take the view that the substantive rights of the competent and the
incompetent person are the same in regard to the right to decline potentially life-prolonging
treatment. The factors which distinguish the two types of persons are found only in the area of
how the State should approach the preservation and implementation of the rights of an
incompetent person and in the procedures necessary to that process of preservation and
implementation." ).
98. This is not to say that the Equal Protection Clause requires every fundamental right to be
extended to the mentally impaired. I simply argue that the state must assert a sufficiently
important interest in denying mentally impaired individuals the ability to have such rights
exercised on their behalf-the type of interest absent in the instant case of organ donation to
innediate family members.
99. 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (Wis. 1981) ("[W]e find it somewhat too facile when discussing
the right of privacy, which by definition necessarily refers to the person involved, to find that
there is a genuine choice when that choice cannot be personally exercisable.").
100. Id. at 895.
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"[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections." 101
The reasoning of Valerie N. and Quinlan applies to children as well.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that children are entitled to
constitutional rights no less than adults, °2 although the state may regulate
their activities to a greater degree. To say that children do not have the right
to donate organs because, due to their age, they lack the legal capacity to
consent to the procedure is to miss the point. It is precisely because children
cannot exercise this fundamental right for themselves that some form of
proxy consent is constitutionally mandated; otherwise they lose the
opportunity to exercise the right in the only way possible-through their
parent-guardians.
Thus, a standard-whether legislatively or judicially created-that does
not permit children or the mentally impaired to donate organs under
circumstances in which a competent person might reasonably choose to do
so violates the Equal Protection Clause. Given the constitutional undertones
of the rights at stake, a system of judicial approval for organ donation by
incompetents that in practice never permitted it would also be subject to
challenge.' 3 Some sort of legitimate mechanism through which proxy
101. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamete, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
102. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[C]hildren generally are protected by the
same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults ...."); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights."); see, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
337-38, 341 (1984) (upholding "reasonable" warrantless school searches of students' property,
but noting that "[a] search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her
person, no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of
subjective expectations of privacy"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979) (considering the
procedural protections necessary to "protect[] adequately the child's constitutional rights by
reducing risks of error without unduly trenching on traditional parental authority" regarding
voluntary commitment of children to mental institutions); tngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674
(1977) (" [A]t least where school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately decide to
punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we
hold that [the child's] Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated."); Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519 (1975) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a minor from being
charged with an offense in criminal court for which he has already been adjudicated delinquent in
juvenile court); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (" [T]he State is constrained to recognize
a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected by
the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to
the minimum procedures required by that Clause."); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (ruling
that juveniles have the constitutional right to have charges brought against them in juvenile court
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (upholding the right of children to due
process safeguards in delinquency proceedings); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958)
(reaffirming "tt]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school
admission on grounds of race or color" in public institutions); Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (upholding
the First Amendment right of schoolchildren not to salute the American flag).
103. A formal mechanism for proxy consent is insufficient if, as a matter of law, it is
impossible that such a mechanism would ever allow an organ donation to occur. For instance, the
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consent can be tendered for organ donation by incompetents-and which
would in practice actually allow such consent-must exist. The next Part
explores what this mechanism should be.
III. RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND PARENT-GUARDIANS
In this Part, I argue that the Constitution grants parent-guardians the
right to consent to organ donation on behalf of their incompetent wards,
without having their decisions reviewed by judges. I begin by rejecting a
mode of analysis that some courts have employed in the past to resolve this
issue-the doctrine of "substituted judgment." I then show how the
ultimate right of parent-guardians to tender proxy consent can be derived
from the other traditional framework courts employ in this area-the "best
interests" of the prospective donor. Parent-guardians enjoy a
constitutionally protected zone of discretion in determining what is in their
charges' best interests, within which the decision to tender proxy consent
for organ donation squarely falls. I argue that judges may not superimpose
their own arbitrary values and preferences over those of the parent-
guardians.
I then go on, however, to argue that this traditional framework should
be rejected, because for parent-guardians to consider only the interests of
the incompetent is dehumanizing to him or her. A competent person would
court in In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973), permitted the incompetent's
guardian to petition the court to allow a transplant, but declined to authorize the operation because
it would have been nontherapeutic to the patient. Although the court was formally open as a
mechanism for such petitions, by declining requests where the donation would be nontherapeutic
to the incompetent (as all organ donation procedures are), as a matter of law it would be
impossible for any such petitions to be approved. Such hollow recourse does not satisfy the
demands of the Equal Protection Clause.
An analogous situation can be found in California sterilization legislation enacted in the
wake of Valerie N. Section 1958(c) of the new code allowed sterilization of incompetents if,
among other things, it was found that the incompetent "is capable of engaging in, and is likely to
engage in sexual activity at the present or in the near future under circumstances likely to result in
pregnancy." CAL. PROB. CODE § 1958(c) (West 1991). Section 1959, however, stated:
The fact that, due to the nature or severity of his or her disability, a person for whom an
authorization to consent to sterilization is sought may be vulnerable to sexual conduct
by others that would be deemed unlawful, shall not be considered by the court in
determining whether sterilization is to be authorized under this chapter.
Id. § 1959.
The problem arose due to section 261 of the California Penal Code, which stated that
incompetent people were legally incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse; any form of sexual
contact constituted rape. Under the resulting statutory framework, courts could only authorize
sterilization if they found the incompetent was likely to engage in intercourse. Because judges
were not permitted to consider the possibility of illegal sex acts, and the penal code prohibited all
sexual intercourse with incompetents, this criterion could never be fulfilled. The framework thus
prevented courts from approving any sterilization petitions. The appellate court refused to uphold
such an approach, holding that "section 1959 cannot constitutionally be applied to deny Angela's
coconservators the authorization to consent to Angela's sterilization." Conservatorship of Angela
D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411,420 (Ct. App. 1999).
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normally take into account a wide range of factors beyond self-interest in
deciding whether to donate, including the dictates of morality and the
interests of the family as a whole. To compel parents to ignore these factors
in making proxy consent decisions is fundamentally to disrespect the
incompetent and treat him as less than human.
A. The Right of Parent-Guardians To Determine the Best Interests
of Their Charges
This Section explores two separate yet related issues. First, it examines
why one of the standards employed by many courts facing this issue-the
substituted judgment standard-is patently inappropriate for most situations
of this nature. Accepting for the sake of argument the legitimacy of the
second common standard applied by many courts in this area°4-the best
interests standard-this Section goes on to question whether courts should
be permitted to overrule determinations of parent-guardians as to whether
organ donation is in the best interests of incompetent donors.
1. Rejecting the Substituted Judgment Standard
The doctrine of substituted judgment requires a surrogate
decisionmaker to "attempt[] to establish, with as much accuracy as
possible, what decision the patient would make if he were competent to do
so." 15 As one court has noted, "Under the doctrine of substituted
judgment, a guardian of a formerly competent, now incompetent, person
may look to the person's life history, in all of its diverse complexity, to
ascertain the intentions and attitudes which the incompetent person once
held." 106 With regard to nonmature minors and individuals who have been
legally incompetent their entire lives, it is impossible to ascertain their
"likely treatment/nontreatment preferences" by examining their
"philosophical, religious and moral views, life goals, values about the
104. The next Section challenges this assumption.
105. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (I11. 1989) (finding that incompetents
have a common-law right to refuse artificial hydration or nutrition that may be exercised on their
behalf by guardians following a substituted judgment standard).
106. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1325 (1I. 1990) (declining to apply the substituted
judgment standard in determining whether three-and-a-half-year-old twins should submit to a
bone marrow transplant); see also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1251 (D.C. 1990) (" [To determine
the subjective desires of the patient, the court must consider the totality of the evidence, focusing
particularly on written or oral directions concerning treatment to family, friends, and health-care
professionals. The court should also take into account the patient's past decisions regarding
medical treatment, and attempt to ascertain from what is known about the patient's value system,
goals, and desires what the patient would decide if competent.").
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purpose of life and the way it should be lived, and attitudes toward
sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death." 107
Consequently, although some courts claim to apply the substituted
judgment standard in these cases, 8 others properly decline to engage in the
fiction of doing so."' Neither parents nor courts can be expected to
determine how a particular child would feel about donating an organ if she
were ten or twenty years older, or how a mentally impaired person would
feel about organ donation if she did not suffer from a disability. The
substituted judgment test is best left to situations where a previously
competent person expressed definite preferences regarding medical
treatment, including organ donation,"' and due to an accident or some other
107. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987) (affirming the right of a husband to have a
jejunostomy tube withdrawn from his wife, who was in a permanently vegetative state).
108. E.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969) (claiming to apply the
substituted judgment doctrine where a mother sought to have a kidney from a twenty-seven-year-
old incompetent transplanted into his brother, on the ground that "' [t]he right to act for the
incompetent in all cases has become recognized in this country as the doctrine of substituted
judgment and is broad enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters touching on
the well-being of the ward"). In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), the court-appointed guardian ad litem of a severely retarded man dying
of leukemia petitioned the court for permission to decline chemotherapy on his behalf, on the
ground that it would cause him unnecessary suffering while offering little chance of saving his
life. In considering the request, the court applied the "substituted judgment" standard, despite the
fact that the man had been "profoundly retarded and noncommunicative his entire life, which was
spent largely in the highly restrictive atmosphere of an institution." Id. at 430. Basing its
conclusion almost entirely on the fact that the substituted judgment doctrine has a "substantial
pedigree," the court ruled that "the decision in cases such as this should be that which would be
made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the
present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily
enter into the decision-making process." Id. at 431. The court's reference to such bizarre
counterfactuals leads one to conclude that, in cases such as these, the surrogate decisionmaker is
simply applying her own opinion as to what she feels is in the best interests of the ward. See John
A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 48, 63 (1976) ("If preferences are unknown, we must act with respect to the
preferences a reasonable, competent person in the incompetent's situation would have.").
109. See Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("Most children, even in adolescence,
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for
medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments."); Curran, 566 N.E.2d at
1326 ("Neither justice nor reality is served by ordering a 3 2-year-old child to submit to a bone
marrow harvesting procedure for the benefit of another by a purported application of the doctrine
of substituted judgment. Since it is not possible to discover that which does not exist, specifically,
whether the 32-year-old twins would consent or refuse to consent to the proposed bone marrow
harvesting procedure if they were competent, the doctrine of substituted judgment is not relevant
and may not be applied in this case."); Jobes, 529 A.2d at 449 ("The 'substituted judgment'
approach to decisionmaking for patients in the persistent vegetative state is our ideal. We realize
that in some cases it may be unworkable, e.g., when the patient has always been incompetent.");
see also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 427 ("It is somewhat far-fetched for courts to seek to
determine what the incompetent would have wanted if he could have made a utilitarian inquiry. It
is almost incredulous to believe that courts should try to determine the incompetent's putative
ethical outlook as well.").
110. My arguments throughout the remainder of this Note, that the substituted judgment
standard should be abandoned and parents should have the final word in proxy consent decisions,
do not apply in the rare case where the incompetent donor had once been competent and
expressed his values and beliefs to a degree sufficient to allow meaningful application of the
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intervening circumstance, is later unable to effectuate her wishes on her
own."'1
2. Deciding on a Decisionmaker
Whether explicitly or while claiming to apply the substituted judgment
doctrine, many courts take it upon themselves to apply a best interests test
to determine whether organ donation by an incompetent should be
permitted."' In doing so, regardless of whether they reject or ratify the
decision of the parent-guardians, judges displace parent-guardians as the
ultimate arbiters of the best interests of incompetent donors. Even assuming
that the best interests standard is the proper test to apply," 3 allowing courts
to usurp the role of parent-guardians in these circumstances is
unconstitutional.
For parents, "freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment...
[extending to] the care, custody, and management of their child." '1
Consequently, in general, children's parents and the parent-guardians of the
mentally impaired have the right to consent on their behalf to medical
treatment. 1t 5 Due to the nature of the family and the general relationship
between guardians and those for whom they are responsible, it is assumed
that decisions made by parent-guardians are in the best interests of their
substituted judgment test. In such cases, respect for individual autonomy requires that the wishes
of the incompetent donor be respected. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
280 (1990) (ruling that a statutory scheme for allowing family members to terminate life support
of permanently vegetative patients was constitutional because it ensured that the "action of the
surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent").
11. See, e.g., id.; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (N.J. 1976) (holding that the substituted
judgment standard was appropriate to determine whether parents of a twenty-one-year-old woman
may have her feeding tubes removed, where the woman had previously been competent but for
unknown reasons had lapsed into a permanent vegetative state). For an excellent in-depth analysis
of the Cruzan decision, see John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of
Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REv. 1139 (1991). For an interesting
discussion of the history of the substituted judgment test and the best interests test, see Louise
Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE
L.J. 1 (1990).
112. In Strunk, after declaring that it would apply the doctrine of substituted judgment, see
supra note 108, the court declared it would authorize the operation because the lower court had
"found that the operative procedures in this instance [were] to the best interest of [the ward] and
this finding [had] been based upon substantial evidence." 445 S.W.2d at 149; cf Little v. Little,
576 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. App. 1979) (basing its conclusions "on the benefits that the
incompetent donor would derive, rather than on the theory that the incompetent would have
consented to the transplant if he were competent").
113. This assumption is challenged in Section IlI.B.
114. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing the evidentiary burden in
proceedings to terminate parents' relationships with their children permanently).
115. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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charges, and thus such decisions must be accorded great deference."
6 As
the United States Supreme Court declared,
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically [the law] has recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children. 7
Allowing courts to engage in an essentially de novo review of proxy
consent decisions is inconsistent with these constitutional principles.
Typically, parent-guardians are excluded from deciding what is in the
best interests of their charges only when "the balance of risks and benefits
[is] so one-sided that it is unlikely that a parent who would deny this type of
treatment is looking out for the child's best interests.""' Parents have the
"well established legal right to make important decisions for their
children.... [T]he State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that intervening in the parent-child relationship is necessary to
ensure the safety or health of the child, or to protect the public at large." 11"
Such a burden cannot be met with regard to proxy consent for organ
donation.
Consider the line of cases involving parental health-care decisions for
children. Courts have repeatedly stressed that parents "may not deprive a
child of lifesaving treatment, however well intentioned.... Even when the
parents' decision to decline necessary treatment is based on constitutional
grounds, such as religious beliefs, it must yield to the State's interests, as
parens patriae, in protecting the health and welfare of the 
child." 120
116. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("Our decisions
establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural."); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (" It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparations
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Wolinski v. Browneller, 693 A.2d 30, 42
(Md. 1997) (noting the presumption that parents act in the best interests of children); In re Penny
N., 414 A.2d 541, 542-43 (N.H. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that an incapacitated minor's parents
are joint guardians and are presumed to make decisions in the daughter's best interests).
117. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). See generally Arthur J. Dyck, Self-
Determination and Moral Responsibility, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 53, 55-60 (1987) (discussing
family involvement in medical decisions in the context of the doctrine of self-determination).
118. Rosato, supra note 15, at 55.
119. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Del. 1991) (holding that the state cannot
take custody of a minor suffering from a form of cancer known as Burkitt's Lymphoma due to his
parents' refusal to consent to "an extremely risky, toxic, and dangerously life threatening medical
treatment offering less than a 40% chance for 'success' ).
120. Crouse-Irving Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443. 444-45 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
(citations omitted); see also Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Mass. 1978) (holding
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Nonetheless, the state's ability to overrule parental decisions in cases such
as these may be utilized only when the parents' choice is patently
unreasonable by conventional standards and squarely against the child's
interests. Parental rights "do not clothe parents with life and death authority
over their children," 121 but they do demand deference in less extreme
situations. As Part I demonstrated, the risks surrounding organ donation are
small; this is not the type of "one-sided" determination that demands
judicial review.'22
Where grave interests are not at stake, or reasonable people can
disagree over the proper resolution, the judgment of the parent-guardian
should be respected. As a Missouri court noted, where "there is a difference
of medical opinion as to the efficacy of a proposed treatment, or where
medical opinion differs as to which of two or more suggested remedies
should be followed, requiring the exercise of a sound discretion, the opinion
of the parent should not be lightly overridden." 123
It can be argued that courts could play a legitimate role if the
substituted judgment standard were appropriate in these situations."4 Under
that "the State may intervene when parents decline to administer the only type of medical
treatment which evidence before the court indicates could save their child's life.... [F]ainly
autonomy is not absolute, and may be limited where ... parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of their child" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
121. In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Mass. 1991) (permitting the state to compel a
blood transfusion for a minor child over the religious objections of the parents, who were
Jehovah's Witnesses) see also Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp.
1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (holding that a public hospital was not liable for violating the civil rights of
a Jehovah's Witness minor by providing a blood transfusion over the religious objections of both
the minor and his parents). The Georgia court explained: "[T]he [United States] Supreme Court
firmly established that a parent's religious freedom is subordinate to the state's interest in
preserving the health and welfare of the children within its borders." Id. at 1571 n.16 (citing
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)). The court continued: "Not even a parent has
unbridled discretion to exercise their religious beliefs when the state's interest in preserving the
health of children within its borders weighs in the balance." Id. at 1575.
122. At issue here is the donation of nonvital organs, the giving of which will not
substantially impair any major life activities of the donor. The risk to the donor is small, and the
donation will have no long-term impact on the donor's major life activities. See supra notes 33-51
and accompanying text.
Of course, it is possible that special medical circumstances can complicate donation by a
particular minor, substantially impacting the safety or likelihood of success of the procedure and
so endangering the medical welfare of the potential donor to such a degree as to warrant judicial
intervention. As this Section has repeatedly stressed, parents' authority over their children does
not extend to decisions seriously jeopardizing their lives. See supra notes 118-121 and
accompanying text. Nonetheless, given the current state of transplant technology, such judicial
intervention should be rare, and not a consequence of the standard risks discussed in Part I.
123. Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that a court may
order blood transfusions to a child over the religious objections of the parents when necessary to
save the child's life).
124. As discussed in the previous Subsection, however, the substituted judgment standard is
generally inappropriate in these cases, because it leaves parents in the untenable position of
having to prove what children or mentally impaired people would choose for themselves, absent
their youth or mental disability. It should only be used where a previously competent individual
has become incompetent. See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
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the substituted judgment standard, parent-guardians would be responsible
for proving an objective fact-that the potential donor would have
consented to the transplant. When the best interests standard is applied to
organ donation, however, parents are left attempting to persuade the court
to adopt a subjective, value-oriented judgment; any objective issues that do
exist are vastly overshadowed by moral issues. The Constitution has been
interpreted as leaving these types of decisions to parents.
Those courts that have taken it upon themselves to determine whether
organ donation would be in the best interests of incompetent donors have
used tremendously varying approaches. One court, without explicitly ruling
that a transplant would be in the best interests of the donor, found that
removing a kidney from a seven-year-old girl for implantation in her dying
twin sister was permissible because
if the expected successful results are achieved they would be of
immense benefit to the donor in that the donor would be better off
in a family that was happy than in a family that was distressed and
in that it would be a very great loss to the donor if the donee were
to die from her illness.
125
The Texas court in Little v. Little similarly found persuasive the fact
that "[s]tudies of persons who have donated kidneys reveal resulting
positive benefits such as heightened self-esteem, enhanced status in the
family, renewed meaning in life, and other positive feelings including
transcendental or peak experiences flowing from their gift of life to
another." 126 Such reasoning is unpersuasive given that the very reason
proxy consent was necessary is that incompetents are not capable of fully
understanding the consequences of donation, as the participants in such
studies undoubtedly were.
Another court took a different approach, construing "best interests"
more narrowly and finding that the survival of the organ recipient was a
relevant consideration only because the potential recipient had been "the
sole family member to have become involved in placement and treatment
decisions for the incompetent in the past and will likely continue to do
S " 127so .
In contrast, a Louisiana court concluded "that surgical intrusion and
loss of a kidney clearly would be against [the incompetent donor's] best
interest," without providing any reasoning or analysis, notwithstanding the
fact that the recipient was to have been the donor's sister.1 8 In a similar
125. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992).
126. Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Tex. App. 1979).
127. In re Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (App. Div. 1984).
128. In re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
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case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, blocking
a transplant from an incompetent donor to his sister because "[t]here is
absolutely no evidence here that any interests of the ward will be served by
the transplant." '29 A Kentucky judge, in a dissent, agreed that proxy
consent for organ donation should be prohibited because the procedure is
not "of significant benefit to the incompetent." 130
Such subjective, indeterminate, and widely varying conclusions in the
face of similar fact patterns, based on no criteria other than those that
individual judges arbitrarily choose to impose, should not be permitted to
override the constitutionally protected decisions of those who care most for
both the potential donor and donee, and who must live in the aftermath of
whatever decision is ultimately made."'
B. Rejecting the Best Interests Test
The previous Section demonstrated that parental decisions regarding
proxy consent are constitutionally protected under the best interests
framework. In this Section, I reject that framework and argue that parents
have the right to consider a much wider range of factors than merely the
best interests of the potential donor. While in practice this will not make a
difference (because in either case the decision of the parent-guardian is
unreviewable), this latter approach is more respectful of children and the
mentally impaired and assures parents that they are justified in considering
many of the factors their hearts might find relevant, but that the best
interests test (at least as applied by some courts) would not.
1. Morality Requires the Best Interests Test Be Rejected
"To protect the incompetent person within its power, the State must
recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and afford to that person
129. In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Wis. 1975).
130. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Ky. 1969) (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
131. In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), the court was faced with a fifteen-
year-old boy who had been brought to the hospital by his aunt, without his mother's knowledge,
to donate skin grafts to help his cousin recover from severe bums. The mother sued for battery,
alleging that the doctors had operated upon the boy without her consent. The circuit court ruled
that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that there existed the equivalent of a "mature
minor" exception to the general requirement for parental consent for surgery on minors. The
circuit court stated that where a minor is the subject of "a surgical operation not for the benefit of
the person operated on but for another [and that is] so involved in its technique as to require a
mature mind to understand precisely what the donor was offering to give[,] .. the consent of the
parent was necessary." Id. at 123. The Bonner court was more focused on the general principles
of battery and informed consent than on the right of parent-guardians to consent on behalf of their
charges to donate organs. Bonner was not cited in any of the subsequent state cases concerning
proxy consent discussed in this Section. Its lack of analysis or reasoning concerning proxy consent
renders it of little precedential value in this area.
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the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent
persons." 132 The best interests test is justified as a way to avoid exploitation
by ensuring that parent-guardians act only for the benefit of their wards. 33
However, the test, in ostensibly protecting incompetent potential donors, in
fact strips them of their humanity and reduces them to mere vortices for
resources and benefits.
This point appears to have been recognized by only one judge who,
dissenting from the majority's decision to block a kidney transplant from an
incompetent donor to his sister, wrote,
The majority opinion would forever condemn the incompetent to be
always a receiver, a taker, but never a giver. For in holding that
only those things which financially or physically benefit the
incompetent may be done by the court, he is forever excluded from
doing the decent thing, the charitable thing.
34
People in the real world are motivated by factors other than direct
personal gain;'35 especially when family members are in need, people are
often motivated by altruism and empathy.'36 The best interests test,
however, discounts most of the factors that a competent person deciding to
donate would consider relevant. To prohibit consideration of factors other
than self-interest to which most competent individuals would lend serious
132. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Mass.
1977).
133. See, e.g., Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 182 (declining to allow proxy consent for a kidney
donation from a legally incompetent donor because "[a]n incompetent particularly should have
his own interests protected. Certainly no advantage should be taken of him"); IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 52 (Robert Paul Wolff ed. & Lewis White
Beck trans., Bohbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (1785) (" [Elvery rational being exists as an end in himself
and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.").
134. Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 184 (Day, J., dissenting).
135. Some philosophers, advocating "psychological egoism," have argued that "all human
actions when properly understood can be seen to be motivated by selfish desires." Jocl Feinberg,
Psychological Egoism, in REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY 497, 497 (Joel Feinberg ed., 9th ed.
1996). Such theorists recognize, however, that people often act for the benefit of others. They
merely argue that such apparently altruistic acts are in fact selfish because of the feelings of
satisfaction people derive from performing them. See id.
136. MARK J. CHERRY, PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES 6 (1999) (" [A]ltruism is believed to
support individual freedom by fostering personal choice .... [A]Itruism on the part of the donor
may be a real motivating factor." (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a consideration of this
matter from an evolutionary biology perspective, see JAMES R. OZINGA, ALTRUISM 13 (1999).
Ozinga states:
Selfishness may be important, but it is not enough. Concern for one's own germ line
needs to take others into account both because of the possible importance of those
others to one's own germ line and also because cooperation with others is part of what
being human is all about.... Altruism is an instinct for survival that may be in our
genes-an internal force for goodness in everyone that begins with birth.
Id.
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weight is to disrespect incompetents." 7 To assume that a legally
incompetent person should be treated as "always a receiver, a taker, but
never a giver," 1' is to treat that person as less than fully human.
Moreover, courts have explicitly recognized that organ donation to
family members is a moral, albeit not legal, obligation. In the words of one
judge, "Morally, this decision rests with defendant [a potential donor] and,
in the view of the court, the refusal of defendant is morally indefensible." '
For the state to preclude parent-guardians from consenting on behalf of
their wards to do the right thing is to strip children and the mentally
impaired of their dignity by exempting them from the moral obligations
incumbent upon members of families. 4 '
To say, as some courts have, that proxy consent is permissible because
of the instrumental value of the saved lives to the donor sibling seems at
best disingenuous and at worst to miss what is truly at stake in these
decisions. People sacrifice for family members. To act as if incompetents
should never be called upon to do so is to disvalue their role as legitimate
members of the family and to disrespect them in a subtle yet particularly
invidious way.
Incompetents cannot be condemned for failing to heed their moral
duties because they generally are not aware of them or are not in a position
to fulfill them; these moral duties nonetheless exist.'41 Although there are
137. Indeed, when a family member is in need of a transplant, "the majority of donors
volunteer immediately upon hearing of the need without any time delay or any period of
deliberation." ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET AL., GIFT OF LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 241 (1977); see also Aaron Spital, Ethical Issues in
Living Organ Donation: Donor Autonomy and Beyond, 38 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASES 189, 192
(2001) ("When the health of a loved one is at stake... many people will want to donate almost
regardless of the risks involved.").
138. Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 184 (Day, J., dissenting).
139. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (C.P. 1978) (holding that the plaintiff may
not compel the defendant, the only compatible bone-marrow donor, to undergo a bone-marrow
transplant).
140. See Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Designated Organ Donation: Private Choice in Social
Context, in LIFE CHOICES 503, 508 (Joseph H. Howell & William Frederick Sale eds., 2d ed.
2000) (arguing that parents have a moral duty to donate organs to their children); Thomas H.
Murray, Altruism and Health Care: What Community Shall We Be?, in 3 ALTRUISM, SOCIETY,
HEALTH CARE 67, 73 (Anders Nordgren & Claes-Goran Westrin eds., 1996) (" [Tlhe power of
family loyalty, the sense of dedication to each other's welfare ... makes the decision to donate a
kidney so obviously and overwhelmingly 'right' that for a great many people it requires no further
reflection.").
141. See SHANNON M. JORDAN, DECISION MAKING FOR INCOMPETENT PERSONS 59-60
(1985). Jordan writes:
[Tihe incompetent person is not merely an animal organism whose experience of
pleasure and pain places certain obligations on the rest of us; rather, what follows is
that the incompetent is a person, in traditional terms, because he is a rational being. He
is a rational being because his life depends on rational activity.... The incompetent
person cannot exist at all on his own initiative, whether instinctive or rational. The
incompetent person exists only through a dynamic relation with other persons who
provide rational intentional actions for him,
Id.
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limits to the level of altruism that parent-guardians can require of those in
their care, 14 2 it degrades children and the mentally impaired to prevent their
guardians from doing the right thing, and instead to force them always to
follow the path of their wards' self-interest.
2. Precedent Allows the Best Interests Test To Be Rejected
"The best interests of the child," a venerable phrase familiar from
divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making
the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody.
But it is not traditionally the sole criterion-much less the sole
constitutional criterion-for other, less narrowly channeled
judgments involving children, where their interests conflict in
varying degrees with the interests of others.'43
So wrote the Supreme Court in holding that the INS can detain illegal alien
children who had no families in the United States in government facilities,
despite the fact that it would be undeniably better for the children to be
temporarily placed with foster families. Referring to general principles of
family law, the Court noted, "So long as certain minimum requirements of
child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the
interests of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or
guardians themselves." "
Families, especially immediate families, are fundamental units in our
society, and to treat each member as a self-interest-maximizer is to
misconstrue the nature of familial relations. Many important decisions are
normally made based on the best interests of the family-children take on
after-school jobs, high school graduates forego attending expensive
institutions of higher learning, close friends and significant others are left
behind for a cross-country move. In poorer families, health care itself is
rationed, and the cost of visits to the doctor's office is balanced against the
needs of others in the family.145 Family members regularly are called upon
142. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("Parents may be free to become
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free... to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.").
143. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993) (holding that the INS may detain illegal
alien minors even when families are willing to take nonadoptive custody of the minor).
144. Id. at 304.
145. See F. Allan Hubbell et al., Evaluating Health-Care Needs of the Poor: A Community-
Oriented Approach, 87 AM. J. MED. 127, 129 (1989) ("Reasons that people lacked a regular
source of [medical] care included lack of health insurance, inadequate financial resources, [and]
outstanding medical bills ...."); see also RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS:
ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 86 (1992) (" [O]ur society does indced ration
health care based on an ability to pay .... ); Chris Hafner-Eaton, Physician Utilization
Disparities Between the Uninsured and Insured: Comparisons of the Chronically Ill, Acutely III,
and Well Nonelderly Populations, 269 JAMA 787, 787 (1993) ("Americans without insurance or
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to sacrifice for each other, and parents are most often the ones responsible
for managing the allocation of burdens and responsibilities. "The role of
parents in the life of a family has attained the status of a fundamental
human right and liberty." 146
In ruling that a court may not compel an unwilling, competent
individual to become an organ donor, a Pennsylvania court accurately
noted, "Our society, contrary to many others, has as its first principle, the
respect for the individual, and that society and government exist to protect
the individual from being invaded and hurt by another."' 147 However
accurate this depiction of the relationship among individuals in society at
large may be, it would be a gross distortion to characterize familial
relationships in a similar manner. Family members-parents, children,
adolescents, and adult incompetents living under their care-owe
responsibilities toward each other that do not exist among members of
society at large.
The Pennsylvania court went on to declare, "For a society which
respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or
neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another
member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence." '48
Notwithstanding the harsh and unappealing rhetoric with which this
sentiment is expressed, such interdependence is an essential feature of
families.
Moreover, the rights of marriage and procreation long secured by the
Supreme Court ensure the right of parents to form families.'49 This right to
create a family necessarily implies the right to make decisions concerning
family members required to maintain the family. As the Supreme Court
wrote in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, "[U]nless we close our eyes to
the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been
accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
public coverage are less likely to have their children immunized, seek early prenatal care ... or
see a physician .... ").
146. State v. H., 393 A.2d 1387, 1388 (N.H. 1978); see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (recognizing the "centrality of family life as the focus for personal
meaning and responsibility"); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec.
19, 1966, art. 23, § 1, S. EXEc. DOC. E, 95-2, at 30 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 ("The family is
the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State.").
147. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (C.P. 1978).
148. Id.
149. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (" Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival .... The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations." (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))).
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we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these precedents to the
family choice involved in this case." "' It is grossly inconsistent with other
acknowledged legal rights, the reality of family life, and the moral
obligations family members generally owe one another to hold that parents
may not base a decision to issue proxy consent for organ donation on the
interests of the family.
Such a conclusion seems to be implicit in the court's ruling in Hart v.
Brown.' The court never explicitly ruled that the operation would be in the
best interests of the donor, but instead stated, "To prohibit the natural
parents and the guardians ad litem of the minor children the right to give
their consent under these circumstances, where there is supervision by this
court and other persons in examining their judgment, would be most unjust,
inequitable and injudicious." 152 The ruling was not based on the donor's
best interests so much as on what the judges found to be the absurd
unfairness of preventing a parent from allowing her child to save the life of
her sibling. The court considered the totality of the situation, rather than
solely taking into account the best interests of the child, in determining
what outcome would be "unjust, inequitable and injudicious."' 53 The only
roughly analogous situation is the virtually unchallenged authority parents
have to consent to the surgical separation of Siamese twins, where the twins
may be able both to live if conjoined, and one is virtually guaranteed to die
upon separation. 54
Under current law, parent-guardians enjoy the constitutional right, and
have the moral duty, to take factors other than the best interests of the
potential donor into account. Among other things, these factors are likely to
include the demands of morality and the best interests of the family as a
whole. Instead of focusing on the instrumental value to the potential organ
recipient-that is, how much saving the life of a close relative is in the best
interests of a potential incompetent donor---courts should recognize that
parent-guardians have the right to view such important decisions as
something more than simply calculations of utility.
150. 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
151. 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
152. Id. at 378.
153. Id.
154. See Maria Malave & Jessie Graham, Loving Mom at Peace with Siamese Twins, N.Y.
POST, Apr. 13, 2001, at 6 ("Marrero's doctor suggested she contact another family, which had
traveled to New York-Presbyterian from the mountains of Puerto Rico for an operation last
October to separate their Siamese twins. One of those infants, Janlee, died of heart failure two
days after the surgery."); see also The Moral Dilemma of Siamese Twins, NEWSWEEK, June 22,
1981, at 40.
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IV. BEARING CHILDREN To BE ORGAN DONORS
The right of parent-guardians to tender proxy consent to organ donation
on behalf of their wards will undoubtedly lead to situations where parents
conceive and give birth specifically so that the new baby can act as an
organ donor. Indeed, this is what happened in the highly publicized Ayala
case, wherein parents of a young girl dying of chronic myelogenous
leukemia conceived a new child in the hope that it would be a compatible
bone-marrow donor.' 5 The Ayala case is by no means isolated; according
to one survey, at least forty bone marrow transplants involved a donor
whose birth was primarily motivated by the need for compatible bone
marrow. 5 6 As somatic cell nuclear transfer, or cloning, technology
develops, parents can be assured that the child to whom they give birth will
be a compatible organ or bone marrow donor,'57 and such occurrences are
likely to be even more frequent.
Many commentators have criticized this not only as an inappropriate
reason for having children, but as an immoral objectification of the donor
child that leads parents to view it as instrumentally valuable for its organs,
rather than as inherently valuable.'58 Defenders respond that the practice-
whether accomplished through natural conception, genetic selection, or
cloning-is acceptable, as long as parents are willing to love and accept the
child whether or not it is a compatible donor. 5 9 "If the parents are willing
155. Sally Ann Stewart, Toddler May Be Sister's Lifesaver, USA TODAY, June 4, 1991, at
3A.
156. Matthew B. Hsu, Banning Human Cloning: An Acceptable Limit on Scientific Inquiry or
an Unconstitutional Restriction of Symbolic Speech?, 87 GEO. L.J. 2399, 2425 n.200 (1999) (" [A]
survey of bone marrow transplant centers indicated that 40 such cases of parents conceiving a
child to serve as a bone marrow donor existed.").
157. Mary B. Mahowald, Genes, Clones, and Gender Equality, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 495, 514 (2000) ("If the Ayala family could have cloned Anissa to produce another child, they
would have thereby insured a match for bone marrow donation to her.").
158. Stephanie J. Hong, And "Cloning" Makes Three: A Constitutional Comparison Between
Cloning and Other Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 780
(1999) ("There are, however, some commodification-objectification concerns in creating a child
simply to produce an organ or tissue donor."); Mahowald, supra note 157, at 513 ("In Kantian
language, the obvious moral problem raised by such a situation is that a person is trcated as a
means rather than an end."); see also Anastasia Toufexis, Creating a Child To Save Another,
TIME, Mar. 5, 1990, at 56 ("Children aren't medicine for other people." (quoting Prof. George
Annas)).
159. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 156, at 2425 (" [C]hildren cloned to provide donor tissue will
not necessarily be valued any less than children currently being conceived to provide tissue for a
sick older sibling. In fact, children who were born to provide tissue for an older sibling are
cherished as children in their own right and also as the life-savers of their older brother or
sister."); Mahowald, supra note 157, at 513 ("Regardless of whether the infant was a tissue match
for their daughter, however, they said they would love and care for the child as fully as they loved
and cared for Anissa. In other words, their motives were mixed, as is true of most people most of
the time.").
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to welcome and raise a new child, why would the fact that the new baby is
guaranteed to save a sibling's life weigh against the conception?" 160
Putting aside the thorny issue of human cloning, a prohibition on
conceiving children for the purpose of consenting to donate their organs
would be patently unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court declared in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, "If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." 161
Even from an ethical standpoint, it is unclear that the practice should be
subject to condemnation. Opponents might claim that children could
somehow be psychologically harmed by the knowledge that they were
conceived primarily for their organs. Far from being a decisive argument
against conception, however, this claim gives rise to what in philosophical
circles is referred to as the "future person" problem. It is difficult to claim
that being born for a particular reason (or through a particular type of
advanced reproductive technology) is against a child's best interests, or
inflicts a net harm on that child. But for that parental motive or advanced
technology, the child would not exist. Put another way, one cannot easily
say that a child whose conception was primarily motivated by the need for a
kidney or bone marrow is wronged, because the alternative for that child is
never to have been born at all.' 62
Furthermore, conceiving a child to save a life is hardly a motive that
warrants moral condemnation, even from the perspective of the child
herself. After all, the child "might well prefer that to the idea that one was
an 'accident,' ... [conceived] because contraception or abortion were not
available, conceived to cement a failing marriage, to continue a family line,
to qualify for welfare aid, to sex-balance a family, or as an experiment in
child-rearing." 163 People conceive and give birth to children for a wide
160. Jennifer S. Bard, The Diagnosis Is Anencephaly and the Parents Ask About Organ
Donation: Now What? A Guide for Hospital Counsel and Ethics Committees, 21 W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 49, 72 n.140 (1999).
161. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 217
(1994) (" [P]rocreative liberty should include the right to have children for any motive, including
to serve as a marrow donor, if such goals or uses of the child independently respect that child's
interests.").
162. The "future person" problem has been analyzed extensively as applied to human
cloning. Robertson writes, "[ T]he potentially harmful effects of cloning cannot truly harm the
clone, because there is no unharmed state, other than non-existence, that could be achieved as a
point of comparison. If cloning did not occur, the cloned individual would not exist."
ROBERTSON, supra note 161, at 169; see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., Harming Future Persons:
Obligations to the Children of Reproductive Technology, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1999)
(discussing the "future persons" problem).
163. Laura M. Purdy, Surrogate Mothering: Exploitation or Empowerment?, in BIOETHICS
103, 108-09 (Peter Singer & Helga Kuhse eds., 1999).
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range of reasons, and often for mixed reasons or even no reason at all."6 In
light of some of the commonly accepted purposes for giving birth, doing so
to save a life can hardly be a ground for moral reproach. For these reasons,
the possibility of parents giving birth to children to act as organ donors does
not constitute a compelling argument against recognizing the right of
parent-guardians to tender proxy consent.
V. CONCLUSION
Kathleen Hart's life was saved because her parents were able to offer
proxy consent for kidney donation by her twin sister.'65 Others were not so
lucky. 16 6 Such deaths could be avoided through the recognition of the
constitutional right of incompetent persons to donate their organs to save
the lives of immediate family members. Because the right to make such
donations is an important aspect of the positive right to bodily integrity, the
right to privacy, and notions of fundamental liberty, the Equal Protection
Clause requires that states permit this right-like the right to sterilization
and the right to have lifesaving measures terminated-to be exercised on
behalf of incompetents.
The decision of parent-guardians to tender proxy consent should not be
second-guessed by the courts. Whether or not one feels that parent-
guardians are bound only to consider the best interests of the potential
donor, final resolution of the issue is constitutionally committed to their
sole discretion. Because it is a highly subjective matter, heavily infused
with subjective value judgments as opposed to objective facts, the decision
of the parents should be respected.
To ignore the fact that many competent people would be willing to
donate an organ to save the life of a family member-not merely for the
benefits that would accrue to the donor from having that family member
survive, but simply because doing so is in the nature of belonging to a
164. Kenneth Alpern, listing reasons that motivate people to have children, notes:
Having children is a cultural norm (it is the natural thing to do); it is expected by
parents, peers, religions; it may even be felt to be a duty or fulfillment of God's
command.... [It] gives significance to marriage or to the personal relationship of two
people; children symbolize, express, and actualize the union of the parents.... [It] is a
way of continuing oneself, one's line (family, bloodline, geneline), and one's
species .... Having children is an activity of creation, participation in something
beyond oneself; it gives a sense of power, competence, coming of age, and gender
realization; it proves to oneself and to others one's independence and maturity.
Children are sources of labor and of physical and emotional support, especially in old
age.
Kenneth D. Alpem, Genetic Puzzles and Stork Stories: On the Meaning and Significance of
Having Children, in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 147, 151-52 (Kenneth D.
Alpern ed., 1992).
165. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
166. See supra note 18,
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family-is to neglect a crucial dimension of the issue. Thus, parent-
guardians should not be limited to considering only the best interests of the
child in making this decision. To insist that self-interest, narrowly defined,
should take precedence over the demands of morality for children and the
mentally impaired is to deny members of both groups the dignity of being
treated, even indirectly, as players on the stage of morality.
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